Sub Hunters of the Cold War

The Cold War era saw an unprecedented race for technological supremacy, not just in space but also beneath the waves. As submarines evolved into stealthier and deadlier machines, the skies became a critical battleground in the fight to control the oceans. In the June 1963 issue of Flying magazine, Barry Tully brought us a closer look at three revolutionary aircraft that defined the future of anti-submarine warfare: the Soviet Beriev Type M-10 “Mallow,” the NATO-backed Breguet 1150 Atlantic, and the American Lockheed P-3A Orion. These cutting-edge machines weren’t just marvels of engineering; they were symbols of strategy, ingenuity, and the ever-escalating tension of the Cold War.

In this article, Tully unveils the stories behind these aircraft, their unique designs, and the global stakes that drove their creation. Join me as we revisit this fascinating chapter in aviation history and explore the pivotal role these “sub hunters” played in safeguarding the seas.

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“Three New Sub Hunters” by Barry Tully, published in the June 1963 issue of Flying magazine.

At Moscow’s Tushino Airport, a turbojet flying boat impresses air show spectators with its size, speed and clean lines. In France, a NATO-sponsored turboprop aircraft undergoes development flight testing. In the United States, a large four-engine turboprop airplane enters fleet service with Navy patrol squadrons. 

These three aircraft: the Soviet Beriev Type M-10 flying boat (NATO designation: Mallow), the Breguet 1150 Atlantic and the Lockheed P-3A Orion represent the latest in world antisubmarine aircraft and reflect the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) strategies of the Soviet Union, the NATO Alliance, and the United States. 

The role of aircraft in ASW has been predicted to diminish as submarines reach the status of true submersibles (i.e. capable of extended submerged operation). Since the tentative beginnings in World War I, the chief mission of ASW aircraft has been to search for surfaced submarines. The reliable long-range aircraft of World War II—equipped with radar to detect surfaced subs in daylight or darkness—played a significant part in that war’s anti-submarine operations. But today, with nuclear submarines capable of conducting an entire war patrol while submerged, the aircraft would appear to have become obsolete as an effective ASW vehicle. 

Why, if this is true, would all major powers be busy developing bigger and better anti-sub aircraft? The explanation for this is that the preponderant majority of submarines in service today employ diesel/electric propulsion systems. These vessels (with and without snorkel breathing apparatus) must periodically penetrate the ocean surface to acquire vital atmospheric oxygen. In doing so, they risk exposure to the ubiquitous radar scan of patrol aircraft. 

In addition to its capabilities against conventional submarines, however, the aircraft still is able to limit the effectiveness of nuclear submarines. The prime ASW capability of the aircraft, in terms of naval tactics, is the ability to search a vast ocean area in a relatively short time. This forces submarines to remain deep in areas where the probability of being sighted by aircraft is high. Thus, the mobility of attack submarines is greatly restricted.

The “dash” capability of aircraft—the ability to reach a contact area quickly—is another justification for the existence of ASW aircraft. Operating in conjunction with a long-range detection system, the aircraft is simply a means of getting there “firstest with the mostest.” 

The recent Cuban Blockade was a striking demonstration of the value of patrol aircraft in the cold war. Without long-range patrol aircraft to report the position of approaching Soviet merchant ships, the maintenance of an effective blockage would have proved enormously more difficult. ASW aircraft, in addition to spotting missile-carrying merchantmen, also participated with surface forces in tracking Soviet submarines in the waters off Cuba. 

Thus the aircraft, for the present at least, continues to remain a part of the ever growing array of anti-submarine vehicles. This array now includes newer, faster surface ships and killer submarines equipped with the latest scientific devices to enable them to find, identify and destroy enemy submarines. 

The USSR, until recent years, had regarded submarine warfare as a primarily offensive matter, despite possession of a large, vulnerable maritime fleet. This seemingly complacent ASW attitude stemmed, in part at least, from the independence afforded by Russia’s extensive natural resources, little likelihood of trade with the West during war, and the geographical contiguity of the Sino-Soviet bloc. 

On July 20, 1960, however, an event off the coast of Florida marked the need for a hasty revision of this strategy. The submerged submarine, USS George Washington SSB(N) 598, successfully launched a Polaris fleet ballistic missile giving the Kremlin an ASW headache of migraine intensity.

The Soviet Defense Ministry’s response to the Polaris threat takes two forms: the development of a countering missile-firing sub force and sharply increased emphasis on anti-submarine warfare.

The Soviet ASW build-up is evidenced chiefly in increased destroyer production. Other manifestations include the appearance of hydrofoil patrol craft, navel versions of jet bombers and special-purpose aircraft such as the Beriev Type M-10 flying boat, known in the West as Mallow. 

The Mallow was first observed by Westerners at the Tushino Airport 1961 flying display when a formation of four M-10s participated in the flyover. Despite the brevity of its participation, the swept-wing turbojet flying boat was noted (and photographed) in considerable detail by interested spectators. Marks of an ASW mission (aside from the flying boat hull) were apparent in the observation posts in both the nose and tail. None of the M-10s carried external ordnance stores in their debut appearance. 

The Soviet departure from Western concepts in choosing a pure jet ASW aircraft rather than the relatively slow (but long endurance) turboprop is explained by their high speed “dash” requirement. The 500-knot Mallow can reach a “hot” contact area with minimum time en route. Additionally, the flying boat hull provides the potential for refueling in international waters (during calm seas) from seaplane tenders.

In the fall of 1961, the Russians proceeded to dispel any doubts as to the aerodynamic capabilities of the Mallow by flying it to a number of world performance records for flying boats. The most impressive of these include setting a record of 566 mph over a 15/25 kilometer course: lifting a 33,000-pound payload to 6,562 feet (2,000 meters); and reaching an absolute ceiling altitude of 49,088 feet. 

Photos of this high-performance flying boat reveal a high wing swept approximately 35 degrees, with pronounced negative dihedral creating a distinctive gull wing. Stabilizing outrigger floats (which probably contain auxiliary fuel tanks) are mounted on the wing tips for minimum drag. Prominent wing fences to reduce span-wise airflow attest to the M-10’s high subsonic speed. 

The Mallow’s engine pods under-sling the wing at the root. Spray rails about the bow section of the Mallow appear to be the Beriev solution to the spray problem. It is conceivable that the ingestion of salt spray could be an operational headache with the Mallow. 

The engines are described by the Russians as Type AL-7PB axial-flow turbojets rated at about 15,000 pounds static thrust each. The Russians have been known to be coy about such information and these figures must be considered apocryphal. In view of the Mallow’s apparent size and the performance such cited above, such 20,000-pound thrust engines as incorporated in the Tu-16 Badger bomber would more suitable. 

Size estimates based on numerous photos taken of the M-10 in flight range from 80 to 100 feet in wingspan and from 110 to 130 feet in length. Maximum gross weight must be in the range 100,000 pounds. This size would be sufficient for a crew of 10 men or more and ample ordnance and detection gear. 

If one grants that the Type M-10 has met its aerodynamic design objectives, the aircraft’s effectiveness as an ASW vehicle still hinges on several unknown factors. These include the quality of its search and detection gear, its ordnance load and the aircraft’s all-weather operating reliability. 

Little is known about the type of airborne ASW detectors employed by the Soviets, let alone their effectiveness. Many British and American developments are known, however, and it is safe to assume that such basic ASW tools as search radar, sonobuoys (radio/hydrophone devices, which transmit water noise to planes over-head), and magnetic anomaly detectors have been investigated. Indeed, it would be dangerous to assume the Russians are incapable of a breakthrough or two of their own. 

The Mallow’s anti-submarine armament is no such mystery. It can only be a nuclear depth charge with possible alternative weapons such as homing torpedoes and conventional depth charges. Naval versions of the Badger bomber have been observed with air-to-surface guided missiles, and it is presumed that the Mallow would employ these on a strike aircraft mission. The Polaris submarines, however—Russia’s primary submarine concern—would never be exposed for such a missile attack.

The primary ASW task facing naval strategists of the NATO Alliance is maintaining the flow of seaborne commerce—vital to the economic and military strength of Western Europe—in the face of the greatest submarine threat in history. Russia, today, with more than 400 submarines represents a far greater submarine menace than did Germany in 1939 with only 57 U-boats. 

Should the Soviet submarine force be unleashed, its threat to the NATO Alliance would be severe even in a so-called limited, or non-nuclear war. The submarine threat to the Free World is emphasized by the Navy with the following statistics; On any given day on the North Atlantic, some 2,000 ships are at sea laden with raw materials and finished products. And over 99 per cent of all international exchange—both strategic and non-strategic materials—is carried by ships. 

The defense of shipping lanes from preying submarines requires strong surface forces, hunter-killer task groups and extended offshore patrol by long-range aircraft to pin down marauding submarines. It is for this latter task which the Breguet 1150 Atlantic is being developed. 

The Breguet Atlantic, despite the stunning blow dealt the project by the crash of the number two prototype on April 19, 1962, appears capable of handling the job on all counts. Five NATO nations are participating in its development: France, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and the United States. Hence, when the aircraft goes into production, all will share the business.

The Atlantic appears to be a formidable piece of ASW hardware. Straightforward in design, the twin-turboprop aircraft is powered by Rolls-Royce twin engines rated at 6,000 estimated hp each. These potent power-plants give the Atlantic a design patrol cruise of 195 mph, an endurance of 18 hours and a range of 5,600 miles. The mid-wing aircraft is large: wingspan 124 feet, length 89 feet and maximum gross weight 90,000 pounds. Thus the aircraft is larger, faster and has greater range and endurance than the Neptune. 

Search and detection gear will be essentially that of the Neptune, as will the ordnance load. Radar (housed in a re-tractable radome), sonobuoys, and other standard detection equipment will be carried on board. Anti-submarine rockets, U.S. or French depth charges and both U.S. and British type homing torpedoes comprise the standard ordnance load. 

The latest aircraft to assist in the U.S. Navy’s vast ASW mission is the Navy’s Lockheed P-3A Orion, (former designation: P3V-1) which entered feet squadrons this year. The P-3A, like the Breguet Atlantic a replacement for the Lockheed Neptune, was developed to meet requirements to carry more detection gear and more ordnance over longer distances, at higher speeds and with longer on-station endurance.

Although similar in appearance to the Electra (and utilizing essentially the same production tooling), considerable airframe modifications were required for the ASW mission. These changes include strengthening the wing structure to bear increased G loading, the addition of an (unpressurized) ordnance bay, the addition of a tail stinger housing a magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), and the mounting of wing stations for external ordnance stores. 

Externally, the two aircraft are quite similar. The Orion is about the same size as the Electra with a 99-foot wingspan, and a slightly greater (that MAD stinger) overall length of 117 feet. The maximum gross weight of the P-3 is 125,000 pounds, a difference of about 10,000 pounds more than the Electra.

Internally, of course, the aircraft are totally different except for the fight deck. Aft of that, in the pressurized cabin, the P-3 contains the crew stations with all consoles, cathode ray tubes and other ASW black box paraphernalia rather than the plush interior of the commercial Electra. Some two and one-half tons of communications, navigation and detection gear on the P-3 is said to be the most extensive array of ASW equipment ever loaded aboard an aircraft. Radar, electronic countermeasure equipment (to detect submarine radar), sonobuoys, explosive echo ranging gear, and MAD gear head the list. 

The navigation and communication equipment is also important for the ASW mission. Doppler navigators and automatic tracking equipment permit the pilots to maintain precise search patterns based on the mathematical probability of best submarine contact. Long range communication gear allows the airplane commander to coordinate his actions with other aircraft and surface forces, and permits immediate transmission of situation and contact reports to higher command on shore.

Should the P-3 ever meet a submarine in anger, it certainly will not lack ordnance for the attack. The ordnance mix includes anti-sub rockets (designed to pierce the pressure hull below the water-line of a surfaced sub), high explosive and nuclear depth charges, and acoustic homing torpedoes, all carried in multiple quantities. 

Crews of the Orion also benefit from arming panels developed with “human factor” principles to facilitate safe, efficient operation. Many subs were missed during World War Il, when crews (afflicted with “buck fever” upon sighting a sub after months of fruitless searching) failed to set their confusing “jury-rigged” ordnance panels properly. This resulted in the inability to drop on the first (and frequently the only) pass over a crash-diving U-boat. While not fool-proof, modern armament consoles reduce such blunders. 

Lockheed says that the P-3A has a design cruise in excess of 400 mph and a service ceiling of 30,000 feet, thus doubling the speed and providing 40 per cent more range than the P-2. This will enable the Orion to search 280,000 square miles of coastal area on a single flight at an operating cost of about one cent per square mile, according to Lockheed. 

The Orion-with its performance, detection gear and ordnance is probably the world’s most formidable anti-sub aircraft, although a large airplane for the low-level circling tactics of ASW aviation. The important question, however, is not how well it compares with other aircraft, but how effective it is against modern submarines. The U.S. Navy is exploring that question right now.

The value of such aircraft as the Mallow, the Atlantic and the Orion cannot be disputed in the present state of ASW development. But what about the future? Do such innovations as missiles, long range detection systems, and hydrofoils portend the end of the ASW aircraft? 

Investigation of new concepts to enhance the ASW capabilities of aircraft suggests that this will not occur in the predictable future. High-speed pure jets, VTOLs with broad speed range and independent of catapults and arresting gear, nuclear aircraft with nearly unlimited range-all have excellent ASW potential. 

One new U.S. anti-sub aircraft which seems certain to appear is a flying boat to replace the aging, overweight Martin P-5 (Navy aircraft, like the men who fly them, tend to add weight with the years). The Navy has served notice to industry that it has requirements for a new flying boat. The announcement was reassuring news to many of the Navy’s dedicated P-boat pilots who feared the big boats were heading for the cancellation fate of the Navy’s blimp program. 

The primary task of ASW planners—of all nations—is the enormously difficult one of providing the tightest possible defense against offensive submarine warfare. The advantages of these new manned aircraft will keep the business of ASW aviation about us for a long time. 

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That’s it for now, and I’ll see you in the next one!